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EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN POST-FURMAN CAPITAL
CASES
Michael L. Radelet*
Barbara A. Zsembik**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, the United States Su-
preme Court invalidated virtually all existing death penalty stat-
utes in the United States.' Consequently, those jurisdictions that
wanted to continue to execute were forced to revise their capital
sentencing procedures. Since Furman, nearly all aspects of Ameri-
can death penalty law have been rewritten. Left unchanged by
both the courts and the legislatures, however, are the ways in
which states decide which death-sentenced inmates will have their
sentences commuted through the powers of executive clemency.
Clemency is a broad power resting in the executive branch of the
government. It includes pardons (which invalidate both the guilt
and the punishment of the defendant), reprieves (which tempora-
rily postpone the execution), and commutations (which reduce the
severity of punishment).3 "Clemency decisions - even in death
penalty cases - are standardless in procedure, discretionary in ex-
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versity; M.A., 1974, Eastern Michigan University; Ph.D., 1977, Purdue University; Postdoc-
toral Fellow, 1977-1979, University of Wisconsin; 1990-1991, University of New Hampshire.
** Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Florida; B.A., 1982, University of Ak-
ron; M.A., 1985, Ph.D., 1988, University of Texas; Postdoctoral Fellow, 1988-1990, Univer-
sity of Michigan.
We appreciate the comments of Hugo Adam Bedau on a previous draft.
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). While effectively abolishing most death pen-
alty statutes, the ruling left open the possibility that some mandatory death penalty stat-
utes were still constitutionally acceptable. In later decisions, however, the Court made it
clear that even mandatory death penalty statutes violate the Constitution. Sumner v. Schu-
man, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325 (1976).
2. For an overview of various reactions to Furman, see Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon
Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in Retro-
spect, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 927 (1985).
3. Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
655, 656-57, 660-61 (1991).
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ercise, and unreviewable in result."4 Our focus in this article is on
commutations awarded through the executive branch. In most
states that have a death penalty, this power rests solely in the
hands of the governor who acts alone. Other states use boards of
pardons, which may or may not need gubernatorial concurrence to
act.'
Three separate rationales underlying the use of executive clem-
ency can be identified.6 The first is unrestrained mercy. Clemency
is a free gift of the executive, needing no justification or pretense
of fairness. The second is a quasi-judicial rationale suggesting that
governors and clemency officials may consider factors that were
not presented or considered by trial judges, juries, or appellate
courts. The third rationale is a retributive notion of clemency,
which is intended to ensure that only the most deserving among
the convicted murderers are executed.7 This third rationale is the
narrowest of the appropriate uses of clemency. Historically, the use
of executive clemency has encompassed the broader views of its
proper rationales.8
This article has two goals. The first is simply to document the
frequency of clemency for inmates sentenced to death since 1972.
While several authorities have already commented on the decline
in the frequency and rate of executive clemency in capital cases
over the last two decades,' we attempt to pinpoint that decline by
providing names, dates, and places of the relevant clemencies. This
analysis will allow for the assessment of the precise role of execu-
tive clemency in today's capital punishment process, and will pro-
vide insight into whether executive clemency is a filter available
more in theory than in actual practice.
4. Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv,
L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 257 (1990-91) (citing Deborah Leavy, A Matter of Life and Death:
Due Process Protection in Capital Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 891 (1981)).
5. "At present, of the states with the death penalty, twenty-two confer an exclusive clem-
ency power on the governor, while fifteen use a pardon board or other body to check the
executive." Paul W. Cobb, Jr., Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99
YALE L.J. 389, 392 (1989).
6. Bedau, supra note 4, at 257-58.
7. KATHLEEN D. MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 92-95 (1989).
8. For a discussion of the historical origins and philosophical underpinnings of the mod-
ern use of clemency power in the United States, see Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy
Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEx. L. REv. 569 (1991).
9. See Bedau, supra note 4; Cobb, supra note 5, at 393-400; Joseph B. Schimmel, Com-
mutation of the Death Sentence: Florida Steps Back from Justice and Mercy, 20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 253, 266-67 (1992).
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The second goal of this article is to document the reasons for the
commutations. We can thereby ascertain inductively why clemency
powers have been used in the last two decades. While several au-
thors have provided outlines of various reasons why clemency
might be awarded,1" none has attempted to specify the frequency
with which each reason is used. By looking at the universe of ac-
tual commutations since Furman, we will be able to do this.
II. METHODS
Unfortunately, there is no single source which provides statistics
regarding the frequency of clemency and the names of prisoners
who are awarded clemency in capital cases. The best data bank on
post-Furman capital cases is maintained by the NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund ("LDF") in New York. For every
death sentence handed down in American jurisdictions since 1972,
LDF researchers obtain the defendant's name, demographic infor-
mation (such as sex and race) for the defendant and victim, and
the name and address of the defendant's attorney. The case is then
followed and charted until the defendant is removed from death
row, either by execution, other cause of death, trial or appellate
court decisions, or by executive action. A list of death rbw inmates
and summary of their demographic characteristics, as well as a list
of post-Furman executions, is published regularly by that office."
To identify post-Furman capital cases in which executive clem-
ency was granted, our first step was to contact LDF and obtain the
data for every clemency listed. We found, however, that the LDF
data set was incomplete and inaccurate. It omitted several cases
that we knew (from other sources) were ones in which clemency
had been given, and included other cases in which no clemency
had been awarded. Each case the LDF identified had to be
checked. It was necessary to consult other sources to see whether
clemency cases that were not known to the LDF could be
identified.
To do this, we contacted the American headquarters of Amnesty
International-U.S.A. in New York City, the National Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty in Washington, D.C., and the Capital
10. Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 136 (1964); Bedau, supra note 4, at 259-61.
11. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. (Win-
ter, 1992).
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Punishment Office of the American Civil Liberties Union in New
York City and obtained copies of their clemency files. To identify
or check on individual cases or states, we also contacted exper-
ienced death penalty attorneys and activists, and, in some states,
veteran death row inmates who might know something about indi-
vidual cases. Using these methodologies, we are fairly confident
that we have identified all the relevant cases.
Next, we attempted to learn more about each case. For each
case, we checked appellate decisions and newspaper accounts.
These sources were often sufficient to construct a picture of why
clemency was given. In a few cases, interviews with participants on
the defendant's legal team were necessary to complete the account.
III. FINDINGS
Our search identified seventy cases since 1972 in which inmates
sentenced to death later had their death sentences commuted to
terms of imprisonment through executive clemency procedures. 12
The underlying basis for granting clemency in these seventy cases
can be analyzed by subdividing the clemencies into two broad cate-
gories. In the first category are clemencies given out of "judicial
expediency." That is, cases where commutations were given by the
executive because courts had vacated, or were likely to vacate, the
death sentence, and a commutation would save the time and ex-
pense of going through a new sentencing proceeding. The second
category of cases includes clemencies given for humanitarian rea-
sons. Here, the clemencies were awarded because of a governor's
12. This finding differs from the commutation frequencies reported by the United States
Department of Justice, which were recently summarized by Professor Hugo A. Bedau. See
Bedau, supra note 4, at 263. In part, the difference between our frequencies and those com-
piled by the Justice Department is attributable to the fact that the Justice Department
failed to report data on commutations for 1972 through 1977. Id. at 263 n.46. However, the
Justice Department's figures list 64 death penalty commutations for the years 1978 through
1988, while our data show the figure for these years to be 49. Because our search for relevant
cases was thorough, we are convinced that the Justice Department's figures are in error. For
example, the Justice Department reports a commutation in Virginia in 1982. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1982 at 40 (table 17). (As
Bedau reports, in subsequent years the Justice Department did not break down its commu-
tation figures by state. Bedau, supra note 4, at 262 n.45). Our interviews with several Vir-
ginia death penalty attorneys and paralegals, as well as the records of LDF and the other
organizations we surveyed, failed to identify the case. We do not know whether the errors in
the Justice Department's tallies were caused by carelessness, by occasional confusion be-
tween judicial commutations and executive commutations, or because of inmates sentenced
to death before Furman who were not formally removed from death row until later.
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opposition to the death penalty, or because of unique characteris-
tics of the crime or of the offender. We consider each category in
turn.
A. Commutations for Judicial Expediency
The majority of the clemency cases we identified (forty-one
cases, 58.6 percent of the total) fall into this category. Included are
five clemencies from Virginia in 1976 and thirty-six cases from
Texas. Because the characteristics of the crime or the offender
were irrelevant to the clemency decisions, we will not present de-
tails of the cases.
On October 19, 1976, Virginia Governor Mills E. Godwin, Jr.,
commuted the death sentences of five inmates: Allen Gooch, Mal-
cohn Jefferson, Vernon Joe, Tony Lewis, and Edward Washington.
Gooch had been convicted in a murder-for-hire plot, while the
other four were convicted of killing prison guards.13 Governor God-
win commuted the sentences in light of two recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions invalidating mandatory death penalty statutes
(similar to Virginia's) in other states.14
The remaining thirty-six commutations given for judicial expedi-
ency are from Texas. In Texas, a death sentence can be imposed
only by unanimous vote of the trial jury.15 If an error is committed
at the sentencing phase of a trial, the case cannot be remanded for
a new sentencing proceeding. Likewise, the highest criminal court
in Texas, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, "has long held that
it may not reduce the punishment assessed by the jury."' 6 Rather,
according to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, "[i]n the
event the jury shall fail to agree, a mistrial shall be declared, the
jury shall be discharged, and no jeopardy shall attach.' 7 Thus,
"[i]f the punishment was erroneously imposed, then the case
stands in the same position as if the jury had failed to reach a
13. Claude Burrows, Death Sentences of 5 Commuted, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct.
19, 1976, at 1.
14. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). For the effect of these decisions on Vir-
ginia's capital statute, see James T. Lloyd, Jr., Questions Surrounding Virginia's Death
Penalty, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 605 (1983).
15. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENI. THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MIS-
TAKE 67 (2d ed. 1981).
16. Ocker v. State, 477 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
17. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.07(3)(c) (West 1993).
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
verdict."'18 The whole case, including the guilt-innocence phase,
must be redone. In contrast, "a commutation does not affect the
judgment, but merely mitigates the punishment that can be
given."'19 To avoid the expense of a new trial, clemency powers can
be used.2 0
After a death sentence is commuted to life, error at the punish-
ment stage of the trial is judged to be "harmless."'" In one notable
case, an innocent death row inmate from Texas, Randall Dale Ad-
ams, won sentencing relief from the United States Supreme
Court.22 Adams was hoping that a new trial would allow him to
prove his innocence. However, two weeks after the Supreme
Court's decision, Governor Bill Clements instead commuted Ad-
ams' sentence to life imprisonment, thereby denying Adams the
opportunity to have his case reheard.2s It took eight more years for
Adams to establish his innocence and gain his freedom. The vindi-
cation came only because he was fortunate enough to interest a
movie producer in his case.24
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Adams v.
Texas25 also affected other cases. Most of the Texas clemencies we
identified resulted from the decisions in either Adams or Smith v.
Estelle.2 6 The three dozen commutations from Texas are:27
18. Ocker, 477 S.W.2d at 291.
19. Whan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
20. But a commutation to imprisonment is not always given when there is reversible error
at sentencing. For example, Johnny Penry won relief from the United States Supreme Court
because his sentencing jury had been unable to hear evidence of his mental retardation.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 492 (1989). Instead of the state's clemency powers being in-
voked, Penry was given a new trial and was resentenced to death. ROBERT PERSKE, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN PERSONS WITH RETARDATION OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES ENCOUNTER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 63-75 (1991).
21. Adams v. State, 624 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Whan, 485 S.W.2d 275.
22. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
23. RANDALL ADAMS ET AL., ADAMS V. TEXAS 182-86 (1991).
24. Id.; MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 60-73 (1992).
25. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
26. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
27. Information on most of the Texas cases comes from the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund in New York. However, crucial additional information was provided by
Texas death row inmate Jim Vanderbilt, who has charted Texas death penalty cases from
his death row cell in Huntsville for the last 16 years. We are indebted to Mr. Vanderbilt for
sharing his work with us.
Our attempts to pinpoint the precise reasons for each commutation failed. Upon asking,
we were told, "unfortunately, I am unable to release that information to you upon the ad-
vice of our legal counsel." Letter from Rebecca Tinkey, Executive Clemency Unit, Pardons
and Paroles Division, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, to Michael L. Radelet (Oct. 11,
1991) (on file with authors).
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July 11, 1980.
Feb. 19, 1981.
May 19, 1981.
June 1, 1981.
June 17, 1981.
June 17, 1981.
Aug. 17, 1981.
Oct. 16, 1981.
Oct. 21, 1981.
Oct.
Oct.
21, 1981.
21, 1981.
Nov. 9, 1981.
Nov. 9, 1981.
Jan. 7, 1982.
Jan. 7, 1982.
Apr. 30, 1982.
June 15, 1982.
June
June
June
1982.
1982.
1982.
Sept. 20, 1982.
Oct. 20, 1982.
Nov. 18, 1982.
Dec. 6, 1982.
Jan. 11, 1983.
Randall Dale Adams.
James Burns.
John Henry Quinones.
Jeremiah O'Pry.
Jackie Ray Osteen.
Ernest Benjamin Smith.
James Simmons.
Magdaleno Rodriguez.
Artie Armour.
William Hammett.
John Lewis Wilder.
George Clark.
Kenneth Davis.
Kent Graham.
William Hovilla.
Robert May.
Selwynn Gholson.
Anderson Hughes.
Richard Denney.
Larry Joe Ross.
Mark Moore.
Doyle Boulware.
Sammie English.
Benard Ferguson.
Wilbur Collins.
There is, however, a relatively standard "proclamation" that is released at the time of the
commutation. Although it does not specify reasons for the commutation, it reveals proce-
dures and who recommends the commutation. The following proclamation concerning Mur-
riel Crawford is a typical one:
WHEREAS, MURRIEL DON CRAWFORD, JR., EXECUTION NO. 569, was con-
victed of the offense of Capital Murder, Cause No. 17618B, on April 15, 1977, in the
181st Judicial District of Potter County, Texas and the sentence was set at Death,
and
WHEREAS, the District Judge of the 181st Judicial District Court, Potter County,
Texas, the District Attorney of Potter County, Texas, and the Sheriff of Potter
County have recommended commutation from Death to Life Imprisonment in the
Texas Department of Corrections, and
WHEREAS, the Board of Pardons and Paroles of Texas subsequently recommended
the Commutation of Sentence from Death to Life Imprisonment in the Texas Depart-
ment of Corrections ....
William P. Clements, Governor of Texas, Proclamation No. 87-20741 (Oct. 14, 1987).
As the case of Randall Dale Adams illustrates, the defendant himself need not apply for
(or even desire) the commutation. Adams, 624 S.E.2d 568.
1993]
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Mar. 15, 1983.
Mar. 22, 1983.
Mar. 22, 1983.
Sept. 6, 1983.
Nov. 18, 1983.
Nov. 22, 1983.
May 4, 1984.
Dec. 13, 1984.
Apr. 30, 1987.
Oct. 14, 1987.
July 11, 1990.
Jerry Hartfield.
Moses Garcia.
James Livingston.
Stanley Burkes.
John Shippy.
Alton von Byrd.
Walter Bell.2"
Jesse Villarreal.
Jose Moises Guzmon.
Murriel Crawford.
Phillip D. Tompkins.
Table 1 displays the frequency of clemencies by year. The first
column of this table lists only the "judicial expediency" cases.
Thirty of the thirty-six Texas commutations (83.3 percent) were
granted over the three-year period from 1981-1983. Clearly, this is
because the rulings in Adams2" and Smith" affected several in-
mates, and authorities reacted to the decisions by giving mass
commutations.
28. Mr. Bell remains on death row in Texas under a second death sentence. See NAACP
LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., supra note 11, at 32.
29. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
30. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
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Table 1
Commutations in American Capital Cases, 1973-1992
Year
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Commutations
Judicial Humanitarian
Expediency
Total
0
0
0
5
1
0
2
3
13
11
8
2
0
5
3
2
1
2
10
2
Totals 41 29 70
B. Commutations for Humanitarian Reasons
The second category of cases is more consistent with the tradi-
tional role of clemency as a humanitarian act. Called "justice-en-
hancing" commutations by Kobil,31 these clemencies are intended
to ensure that the punishment is truly fair and commensurate with
the defendant's blameworthiness. We have identified twenty-nine
such cases. They are listed, each with a brief descriptive vignette,
in Appendix A.
31. Kobil, supra note 8, at 579-83.
1993]
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The second column of Table 1 displays the annual frequencies of
commutations given for humanitarian reasons. There are no clear
trends, but two years stand out: 1986, when five clemencies were
awarded, and 1991, when there were ten.
All five of the clemencies granted in 1986 were to inmates from
New Mexico. In his last few days in office, Governor Toney Anaya
commuted the death sentences of the five inmates on his state's
death row.2 Although the characteristics of the crime and the of-
fender were not relevant to the commutations (since all New Mex-
ico death row inmates were affected), we classify these as humani-
tarian commutations because they were motivated by the
unqualified humanitarian anti-death penalty attitudes of the
,Governor.
The year with the highest number of humanitarian clemencies
was 1991. Eight of these were granted by the outgoing Governor of
Ohio, Richard Celeste."s Unlike the New Mexico clemencies, these
commutations did not empty Ohio's death row. In fact, there were
101 Ohio death row inmates whose sentences were not commuted.
The eight cases were carefully selected on the basis of their un-
usual facts and the life histories of the defendants.34 At that time
there were four women on death row in Ohio, and all four had
their death sentences commuted.
Seven of the eight Ohio clemencies given by Governor Celeste
(all but Beatrice Lampkin's) are being contested.35 Governor
Celeste's successor, George V. Voinovich, asked the Attorney Gen-
eral to appeal the commutation orders because Governor Celeste
had allegedly not followed a rule requiring him to consult with the
Ohio Adult Parole Authority before making commutation deci-
sions.36 On February 14, 1992, a Franklin County Common Pleas
judge overturned the clemency decisions and ordered the seven de-
32. Governor Anaya discusses these commutations in his contribution to this symposium.
See Toney Anaya, Statement by Toney Anaya on Capital Punishment, 27 U. RICH. L. REV.
177 (1993).
33. Kobil, supra note 3, at 656-57, 677-80. In the month before leaving office in January
1991, Governor Celeste actually granted 68 pardons and commutations, most in non-capital
cases. Id. at 675.
34. See Appendix A for the relevant attributes of each case and defendant.
35. Because the State found no problems with the procedures Governor Celeste used in
commuting Lampkin's sentence, her commutation was not challenged in the courts. Kobil,
supra note 3, at 684-92; Jim Underwood, Judge Voids Clemency for 11 Prisoners, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 14, 1992, at IA.
36. Kobil, supra note 3, at 656.
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fendants to return to death row.37 Nonetheless, because the com-
mutations are still being litigated and because the cases inform us
about the types of situations in which at least one governor be-
lieves clemency is warranted, we retain the seven contested Ohio
cases in our inventory.
IV. REASONS FOR CLEMENCY
The next step of our analysis attempts to identify the reasons
for each executive clemency. In some states, such as Florida, the
governor is not required to state the precise reasons for clemency,3
so some speculation is necessary. To prepare the vignettes for Ap-
pendix A and to determine the reason underlying each decision, we
examined appellate decisions, journalists' accounts, and, where
available, transcripts of oral clemency arguments and any commu-
tation proclamations that the governor may have issued.
Table 2 summarizes the variety of reasons that probably explain
why clemency was granted in our universe of seventy cases. It be-
gins by listing the frequency of clemency across states, indicated
by the number in parentheses in the first column. It then divides
the clemencies into "judicial expediency" cases (all from Virginia
and Texas) and "humanitarian" clemencies. Among the humanita-
rian commutations, the largest number of clemencies was granted
to Ohio death row inmates (eight), followed by Florida (six), New
Mexico (five), Georgia (four), and Virginia (two). Bearing in mind
that the Ohio and New Mexico clemencies were given because of
the conscientious scruples of two governors, the paucity of clemen-
cies becomes even more apparent. No other state has seen more
than one humanitarian commutation in a post-Furman death pen-
alty case. In sharp contrast to the large numbers of clemencies
granted in the pre-Furman years,39 North Carolina has since
granted only one clemency, as have Louisiana, Maryland and
Montana.
37. 7 Taken Off Death Row Are Returned There, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at 33.
38. Schimmel, supra note 9, at 264.
39. The data reported by Professor Bedau reveal that there were 229 commutations in
North Carolina in the 46 year span, 1909-1954. Bedau, supra note 4, at 265.
1993]
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Table 2
Reasons for Commutations of Death Sentences by State
Judicial
N* Expediency Humanitarian
Mercy Guilt Mental Equity Other
Doubtful Problem
Florida (6) 3 1 1 1
Georgia (4) 3 1
Louisiana (1) 1
Maryland (1) 1
Montana (1) 1
New Mexico (5) 5
North Carolina (1) 1
Ohio (8) 1 6 1
Texas (36) 36
Virginia (7) 5 2
Total (70) 41 5 9 7 5 3
• Number of Clemencies
Also notable is the absence of several states from the tallies in
Table 2. No commutations for humanitarian reasons have been
granted in any post-Furman capital cases in either Texas or Cali-
fornia, although each state has death row populations surpassing
300 and Texas leads the country with fifty-four executions in the
decade preceding December 31, 1992.40 Other states with more
than 100 death row inmates in which no humanitarian commuta-
tions have been granted include Alabama (114 condemned in-
mates), Arizona (110), Illinois (154), Oklahoma (120), Pennsylvania
(145), and Tennessee (105). 4'
Table 2 further divides the humanitarian commutations into five
subcategories: those clemencies given because of 1) unqualified
mercy, 2) lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt, 3) the de-
fendant's mental problems that reduce blameworthiness or culpa-
bility, 4) proportionality when compared to the sentence of an
equally or more culpable codefendant, and 5) other reasons.
The first subcategory of humanitarian reasons reflects clemen-
cies commuted as an act of mercy, unqualified by any characteris-
tics of the crime or offender. Here we place the five cases com-
40. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., supra note 11, at 6.
41. Id. at 10, 12, 22, 31, 32, 34.
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muted by New Mexico Governor Toney Anaya; their uniqueness
warrants a separate category.
Second is a subcategory of cases in which the clemency was
given because of lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt. In-
cluded here are three cases from Florida (Alford, Rutledge, and
Salvatore), two from Virginia (Bassette and Giarratano), and four
from other states (Foster, Grant, Maynard, and Monroe). As long
as states continue to use the death penalty, innocent defendants
will occasionally be executed.42 The record shows that executive
clemency often proves to be the decisive step that averts a terrible
miscarriage of justice.43 It remains a legitimate means of reducing
the odds of fatal error.44
The third subcategory, which can be called "blameworthiness,"
reflects the quasi-judicial rationale of considering mitigating cir-
cumstances, specifically the mental capacity of the individual at
the time of the crime. Included here is one Florida case (Hoy), and
six of the eight clemencies awarded by Ohio Governor Richard
Celeste (Brown, Green, Jenkins, Jester, Maurer, and Seiber). In
each, the persuasive factor leading to the grant of clemency ap-
pears to have been the defendant's mental illness or low I.Q. Hoy's
attorney, for example, argued at the clemency hearing that Hoy's
youth, low intelligence, and susceptibility to domination by his co-
defendant tended to reduce Hoy's blameworthiness for the crime.
The fourth category, "equity," includes cases in which an equally
or more culpable codefendant was not sentenced to death. Hence,
the condemned inmate's sentence was commuted on the ground of
equity. In Florida, it appears that Richard Gibson's death sentence
was commuted because one of his accomplices was sentenced to
life and two others were never prosecuted. In Ohio, Beatrice
42. RADELET ET AL., supra note 24, at 270-81; Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Mis-
carriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987).
43. Numerous such cases are cited in RADELET ET AL., supra note 24. Among them is the
case of Isidore Zimmerman, whose death sentence was commuted within two hours of his
scheduled execution. After serving 24 years in prison, Zimmerman was successful in proving
his innocence. Id. at 43-55.
44. Nonetheless, inmates are still executed despite widespread belief that they might be
innocent. For example, on May 18, 1992, the cover of Time magazine pictured Virginia
death row inmate Roger Keith Coleman. Over his picture was the caption, "This Man Might
Be Innocent. This Man Is Due To Die." The accompanying article detailed several holes in
the state's case. Jill Smolowe, Must This Man Die?, Tiar, May 18, 1992, at 40. Coleman was
executed on May 20, 1992. Peter Applebome, Virginia Execution Highlighted Politics of
Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1992, at B9.
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Lampkin was convicted of hiring someone to murder her abusive
husband, but the trigger-man was sentenced to life. In Georgia, the
codefendant of Freddie Davis, although equally culpable, was sen-
tenced to life; a codefendant of Charles Hill's was sentenced to life
despite the fact that his codefendant was the trigger-man, and
Harold William's accomplice (a half-brother) was convicted only of
voluntary manslaughter. To the degree that one goal of the death
penalty is to secure "justice," clemency can help insure that the
punishment among codefendants is equitably distributed according
to their culpability.
Finally, three clemencies were given for "other" reasons. In
Georgia, William Neal Moore was granted clemency largely based
on his rehabilitation after imprisonment. Moore's appeal for clem-
ency was also supported by pleas for clemency from the victim's
family, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, and Mother Teresa. David
Keith was given clemency by Montana Governor Ted Schwinden
for reasons that included Keith's partial paralysis and blindness,
remorse, and religious conversion. Finally, Florida prisoner Clifford
Hallman was awarded a commutation because evidence not known
to his jury demonstrated that the victim died from hospital mal-
practice, and that his criminality was more consistent with an ag-
gravated assault than with a homicide.
Professor Bedau lists nine reasons why clemencies have been
given in capital cases. "5 We can now use our data on the seventy
cases to evaluate and modify that list. In Bedau's words,4" the nine
reasons are:
1. "The offender's innocence has been established." We found no
post-Furman cases in this category.
2. "The offender's guilt is in doubt." This category clearly in-
cludes nine of our cases; we also include the case of Clifford Hall-
man (which we classify as "other"). Hallman's case fits in the sense
that there were doubts that he had sufficient criminal intent to be
guilty of first-degree murder.
3. "Equity in punishment among equally guilty co-defendants."
This category accounts for five of the post-Furman clemencies.
45. See Bedau, supra note 4, at 260-61.
46. Id.
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4. "The public has shown conclusively albeit indirectly that. it
does not want any death sentences carried out." No cases in our
inventory fit this description.
5. "A nonunanimous vote by the appellate court upholding a
death sentence conviction leaves disturbing doubt about the law-
fulness of the death sentence." We found no such cases.
6. "The statutes under which the defendant was sentenced to
death are unconstitutional." Like Bedau, we include the five com-
mutations granted by Governor Godwin in Virginia here.
7. "Mitigating circumstances affecting the death row prisoner's
status warrant commutation to a lesser sentence." Here we include
the seven clemencies given because of the inmates' mental
problems, as well as the Montana case of David Keith.
8. "Rehabilitation of the offender while on death row." Although
rehabilitation undoubtedly played a secondary role in many of our
cases, the only case in which it was given as the sole or most im-
portant reason was the Georgia case of William Neal Moore.
9. "The death penalty is morally unjustified." Like Bedau, here
we include the five commutations from New Mexico.
Not included as a rationale for clemency by Bedau, but clearly
apparent, is a category for the commutations done out of judicial
expediency in Texas. Since these cases constitute more than half of
the, post-Furman clemencies awarded in American capital cases,
future work on clemencies will need to include "judicial expedi-
ency" as a relevant category.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In calendar year 1992, there were twenty-seven executions in
American jurisdictions, constituting the highest yearly figure since
1962.41 Yet, at the end of 1992 there were still some 2,700 inmates
on America's death rows.48 Simple calculations tell us that even if
current execution rates were to double - to sixty a year -- the
present backlog of those in the queues for America's death cham-
bers will not be eliminated until the year 2037. Clearly something
has to change.
47. HUGo A. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 25 (3d ed. 1982).
48. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., supra note 11, at 1.
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Easiest to change is the sluggish rate with which clemency is
awarded. The data presented in this Article show that clemency in
a capital case is extremely rare, particularly in light of the high
number of inmates whose death row status makes them eligible for
such mercy. Even under the narrow standards now being used in
awarding clemency to death row inmates, there are numerous cases
of inmates condemned to death who are mentally retarded,49 men-
tally ill,50 non-triggermen,51 and juveniles 52 who are arguably de-
serving of clemency. Further, given ample evidence that death sen-
tencing in America is partly a function of legally irrelevant factors
such as the quality of the defense attorney53 and the race of the
victim, 54 as well as evidence that innocent defendants are occasion-
ally sentenced to death,55 the frequency of executive clemency
should increase. For each case listed in Appendix A, there are
many (in some instances, dozens of) similar cases of current death
row or already executed inmates who have not yet received, or did
not receive, executive clemency. The cases reviewed in Appendix A
clearly demonstrate that clemency authorities looking for recent
precedent for commuting death penalty cases can usually find it.
The patterns evident from the clemency data support the con-
clusion that state executives have failed to use their clemency pow-
ers to ensure that only the most blameworthy and irredeemable
defendants enter the execution chambers. Clearly, the forty-one
clemencies granted for judicial expediency do not satisfy the goal
of justice or mercy. They were granted for purposes that suited the
immediate and specific needs of the justice system itself, not be-
cause of any characteristics of the inmate.
The "governor-specific" humanitarian rationales for granting
clemency also reveal the idiosyncratic nature of the use of execu-
49. PERSKE, supra note 20.
50. See Dorothy 0. Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational Char-
acteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838
(1986).
51. Douglas W. Schwartz, Note, Imposing the Death Sentence for Felony Murder on a
Non-Triggerman, 37 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1985).
52. VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES (1987).
53. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatally Flawed, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 19, 1990, at 1.
54. A recent review of scholarly research on this question is found in Michael L. Radelet
& Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death Penalty in Florida,
43 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1991). Professor Margaret Vandiver's article in this symposium also ana-
lyzes this issue. See Margaret Vandiver, The Quality of Mercy: Race and Clemency in Flor-
ida Death Penalty Cases, 1924-1966, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 315 (1993).
55. RADELET ET AL., supra note 24.
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tive clemency. Among the twenty-nine humanitarian commuta-
tions, seven granted in Ohio may still be rescinded, and five others
are attributable solely to the personal convictions of one man, Gov-
ernor Toney Anaya. These aside, we are left with only seventeen
executive clemencies in capital cases in the last two decades - less
than one per year - that were truly based on the characteristics of
the crime or the defendant.
We conclude that the exercise of executive clemency in post-
Furman capital cases is idiosyncratic at best, and arbitrary at
worst. Overall, it seems to add, rather than subtract, an element of
luck in the ultimate decision of who ends up being executed. The
Furman decision attempted to correct the capricious element in
processing capital cases at the sentencing stage. The evidence re-
viewed here clearly indicates that the final stage of the judicial
process deserves similar reconsideration. Strong precedent is still
available to executive authorities who might want to use their
power to commute death sentences. But until that power is used
more regularly, its crucial role in achieving both justice and mercy
will remain unfulfilled.
19931
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APPENDIX A: INVENTORY OF CASES
1. Alford, Learie Leo. Florida. June 26, 1979. Alford was con-
victed on mostly circumstantial evidence of the January 1973 rape
and murder of a thirteen-year-old.5 In 1977, an eyewitness re-
canted the testimony he had given at trial and told the authorities
that the true killer was much larger than Alford.51 The witness had
been reluctant to come forward with this information after the
trial because of a fear of being charged with perjury.58 At the clem-
ency hearing before Florida's cabinet, the main argument made by
Alford's attorney in favor of clemency was "Learie Alford did not
commit the murder he was convicted of."5 9
2. Bassette, Herbert Russell. Virginia. January 23, 1992. Despite
steadfast claims of innocence and alibi testimony, Bassette was
convicted in 1980 of robbing a gas station and murdering the six-
teen-year-old gas station attendant.60 The foundation of the state's
case was provided by three of Bassette's companions, all of whom
were drug users and convicted felons.6 1 Ten hours before Bassette's
scheduled execution, Governor L. Douglas Wilder commuted the
death sentence to life-without-parole because of doubts about Bas-
sette's guilt.6 2 Bassette's volunteer attorneys estimated that they
had spent more than $200,000 of billable hours on the case. 3
3. Brown, Debra Denise. Ohio. January 10, 1991. Brown and a
male companion, Alton Coleman, were convicted of abducting and
killing a fifteen-year-old Cincinnati girl.64 The state also argued
that she was linked to at least eleven other murders and attempted
murders in a five-state murder spree.6 5 Brown's was among eight
death sentences commuted by Governor Richard F. Celeste during
56. Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 912 (1976).
57. Deborah L. Ibert, Two Get Decision on Mercy, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, June 20,
1979, at 1A, 9A.
58. Argument on behalf of Learie Alford, Transcript of Argument for Executive Clemency
at 13, April 20, 1979 (on file with authors).
59. Id.
60. Bassett (sic] v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 848-49, 284 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1981); Bas-
sette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. (1990).
61. Arthur Hodges, Bassette Escapes His Date With Death, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Jan. 24, 1992, at 1, 2.
62. John F. Harris, Va. Death Sentence Commuted, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1992, at Dl;
Hodges, supra note 61, at 1.
63. Hodges, supra note 61, at 2.
64. State v. Brown, 528 N.E.2d 523, 529 (Ohio 1988).
65. Id.
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his last week as governor.66 However, a death sentence that Brown
received in Indiana was unaffected. Brown's low I.Q. scores (rang-
ing from 59 to 74) and her "master-slave" relationship with Cole-
man were among the reasons given for the clemency.61
4-8. Cheadle, David; Compton, Joel Lee; Garcia, Richard; Gil-
bert, William; and Guzman, Michael. New Mexico. November 26,
1986. Five weeks before leaving office, Governor Toney Anaya com-
muted the death sentences of all five New Mexico death row in-
mates, based on the general ground of mercy and his moral stand
against the death penalty."
9. Davis, Freddie. Georgia. December 16, 1988. Davis and a com-
panion, Eddie Spraggins, were convicted of breaking into a home,
raping its owner, and stabbing her to death. Both were sentenced
to death. On appeal, Davis's death sentence was vacated because of
erroneous jury instructions,69 but it was reimposed after a new sen-
tencing hearing.70 At both trials, the main witness against Davis
was Spraggins, but shortly after the second trial Spraggins began
to take full responsibility for the crimes. Various appeals failed. 1
In 1988, Spraggins won a new trial. He was sentenced to life im-
prisonment after again taking full responsibility. The next day,
just forty-eight hours before Davis's scheduled execution, his death
sentence was commuted by the State Board of Pardons and Pa-
roles. The commutation was granted because the Board felt that
similar degrees of culpability warranted similar punishments. One
member of the Board said: "The scales of justice were just out of
balance on this one."72
10. Foster, Doris Ann. Maryland. January 20, 1987. Foster was
convicted of robbing and stabbing her elderly landlady to death
with a screwdriver in 1981. On appeal, a new trial was ordered,"7
66. At End Of Term, Ohio's Governor Commutes Death Sentences For 8, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1991, at 12; Mary Beth Lane, Celeste Commutes Eight Death Sentences, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 11, 1991, at 1.
67. Janan Hanna, Murderer's Ally Sought By Indiana, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1991, § 1, at 5.
68. Anaya, supra note 32, at 177; Robert Reinhold, Outgoing Governor In New Mexico
Bars The Execution Of 5, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 1986, at 1.
69. Davis v. State, 243 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. 1978).
70. Davis v. State, 252 S.E.2d 443 (Ga. 1979).
71. Id.; Davis v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1987).
72. Tracy Thompson, Panel Commutes Davis Execution to Life Sentence, ATLANTA
CONST., Dec. 17, 1988, at 1.
73. Foster v. State, 464 A.2d 986 (Md. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
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but Foster was again convicted and condemned to death.74 Gover-
nor Harry Hughes, a death penalty opponent acting on his last day
in office, commuted the sentence to life with no possibility of pa-
role because Foster's husband had confessed to the crime and
there remained some lingering doubts about her guilt. The Gover-
nor commented that "no other individual in recent memory has
been sentenced to death in Maryland with as many mitigating
circumstances. 75
11. Giarratano, Joseph M. Virginia. February 19, 1991. Follow-
ing a confession, Giarratano was convicted of the .1979 murders of
the woman with whom he had been living and her fifteen-year-old
daughter. The daughter was also raped.7" Just three days before
the scheduled execution, Governor L. Douglas Wilder granted a
conditional pardon, based on reasonable doubts/probable inno-
cence. The pardon was done in a way that commuted the sentence
to life imprisonment with parole eligibility, and gave the state's
attorney general the opportunity to order a new trial. It was made
conditional on Giarratano's good behavior in prison, and gave him
an opportunity to accept or reject it. There were contradictions in
Giarratano's confession and parts of his confession did not match
the crime-scene evidence. Nearly 6,000 letters had been received
by Wilder's office from throughout the world asking for the
clemency. 77
12. Gibson, Richard Henry. Florida. May 6, 1980. Gibson and
three companions were involved in robbing and shooting two Bra-
zilian seamen who were on leave in Jacksonville in 1975. One of the
sailors died. At sentencing, Gibson's lawyer did not present any
evidence and Gibson was sentenced to death.78 His accomplice was
sentenced to life and two women who were involved in the crime
were never imprisoned.79 These sentencing disparities were appar-
ently the reason for the commutation.
74. Foster v. State, 449 A.2d 1236 (Md. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
75. Gwen Ifill, Md. Woman's Death Term Commuted, WASH. PosT., Jan. 21, 1987, at B7.
76. Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1989); Giarratano v. Commonwealth,
220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94 (1980).
77. Warren Fiske, Wilder Making Political Hay, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Feb. 20,
1991, at Al, AS; Tony Germanotta, Governor Lets Convict Decide, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Nor-
folk), Feb. 20, 1991, at Al, AS.
78. Gibson v. State, 351 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1004 (1978).
79. Graham Commutes Gibson Sentence, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville), May 7, 1980,
at B4.
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13. Grant, 'Rosalie. Ohio. January 10, 1991. Grant was convicted
in 1983 of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death
for killing two of her children by setting afire their Youngstown
home. Shortly before the fire, she had taken out life insurance poli-
cies (payable to her) on the children's lives8 0 Grant maintained
her innocence throughout the trial and Governor Richard F.
Celeste found the evidence against her to be "scanty at best." In
addition, Governor Celeste thought that Grant, who had given
birth eleven months before the crime, may have suffered from
postpartum psychosis at the time of the crime.8
14. Green, Elizabeth. Ohio. January 10, 1991. Green was con-
victed of aggravated murder and sentenced to death for the rob-
bery-murder of a friend's neighbor. The motive was allegedly to
obtain money with which to purchase cocaine. 2 She is develop-
mentally impaired, with an I.Q. of 66, and was abused and aban-
doned as a child. 3
15. HaIlman, Clifford. Florida. June 26, 1979. Hallman was con-
victed in 1973 of slitting the throat of a barmaid with a piece of
broken glass. 4 No arteries were cut, but the victim died of suffoca-
tion four days later. Hallman's attorneys argued that Hallman did
not possess enough premeditation to render him guilty of first-de-
gree murder. Furthermore, they alleged that had the victim re-
ceived proper treatment at Tampa General Hospital, her death
would have been prevented. Indeed, the victim's family success-
fully sued the hospital for $42,500 for malpractice. The original
prosecutor in the case joined the plea for clemency.85
16. Hill, Charles Harris. Georgia. September 29, 1977. Hill and
two codefendants were indicted in 1975 for breaking into an At-
lanta home and robbing and murdering the resident.86 Hill pleaded
innocent and was sentenced to death, but the actual killer, Gary
80. State v. Grant, No. 83 C.A. 144, 1990 LEXIS 4949 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1990).
81. Ron Coyle et al., Celeste Spares Life of Killer, VINDICATOR (Youngstown, Ohio), Jan.
11, 1991, at Al.
82. State v. Green, No. C-880504, 1990 LEXIS 2798 (Ohio Ct. App. July, 1990).
83. Stark Killer's Sentence Commuted by Celeste, BEACON J. (Akron, Ohio), Jan. 11,
1991, at 1 [hereinafter Stark Killer's Sentence].
84. Hallman v. State, 305 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1974).
85. Wayne Ezell, Hallman is Sure He'll Get New Trial, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Sept. 8,
1977, at 1; Tom Fiedler, Is He Condemned for Hospital's Error?, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 23,
1977, at 1; Ibert, supra note 57; Kevin Kalwary, Clifford Hallman, TAMPA TRIB., June 20,
1979, at 6A.
86. Hill v. State, 229 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 1976).
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Watts, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life. The third perpe-
trator pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for
testifying against his partners. Both the trial judge and the prose-
cutor joined in Hill's plea for clemency, which was based on the
disparity in sentences. It was the first post-Furman case decided
by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. 7
17. Hoy, Darrell Edwin. Florida. January 9, 1980. Hoy was con-
victed of participating in a rape and double murder.88 His accom-
plice, Jesse Hall, was the trigger man. Hall was originally sen-
tenced to death, but after winning a retrial he was sentenced to life
imprisonment. The trial juries originally recommended life
sentences for both Hall and Hoy.s9 At the clemency hearing, Hoy's
attorney emphasized Hoy's youth (age 22 at the time of the crime),
his low intelligence, and his susceptibility to domination by Hall.e0
18. Jenkins, Leonard. Ohio. January 10, 1991. Jenkins was sen-
tenced to death for the 1981 murder of a Cleveland police officer
during an aborted bank robbery. During the shoot-out, Jenkins
was shot in the spinal cord, leaving him permanently paralyzed be-
low the waist." Jenkins was the first person sentenced to death
under Ohio's current death penalty law.2 In commuting the sen-
tence, Governor Richard F. Celeste noted that Jenkins had a de-
velopmental dysfunctioning equivalent to that of a nine-year-old
child, with an I.Q. of 63.s
19. Jester, Willie Lee. Ohio. January 10, 1991. Jester was con-
victed of walking up to a bank guard (in a bank where Jester had
formally worked), killing him with a single gunshot to the chest,
and then robbing the bank. The crimes occurred in Cleveland in
87. David Morrison, Hill Death Sentence Commuted to 99 Years, ATLANTA CONST., Sept.
30, 1977, at 18A.
88. Hoy v. State, 353 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1978).
89. Florida's death penalty law is relatively unique in that it allows judges to sentence
defendants to death even after the jury has recommended a sentence of life imprisonment.
See Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing
Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31 (1985); Michael L. Radelet,
Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVis L. REV.
1409 (1985).
90. Of Convictions and Clemency (editorial), CLEARWATER SUN, Jan. 2, 1980, at 8A; David
Pero, Hoy's Life Spared, CLEARWATER SUN, June 13, 1980, at IA.
91. State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1984); State v. Jenkins, 536 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1987).
92. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2949.21-.36 (Anderson 1987 & Supp. 1991).
93. Lane, supra note 66, at 1; Stark Killer's Sentence, supra note 83, at 1.
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1983. 94 Jester grew up in a deprived environment and suffered
from multiple mental disorders and other problems that were not
made known to his jury. 5 After criticizing Governor Richard F.
Celeste for the commutation, former Assistant Prosecutor William
E. Gerstenslager added, "If anyone should be on a commutation
list, Willie [Jester] should be first. '96
20. Keith, David Cameron. Montana. December 29, 1988. After a
guilty plea, Keith was convicted of abducting and murdering Harry
Shryock in 1984.97 Keith robbed a pharmacy and a convenience
store, took a thirteen-year-old child hostage, and demanded an air-
plane for his getaway. The child was exchanged for Shryock, a pi-
lot. As Shryock was trying to start the plane's engine, the police
shot and wounded Keith, prompting him to murder Shryock.9 8
Governor Ted Schwinden accepted a Board of Pardons recommen-
dation and commuted the sentence to life imprisonment without
parole. The reasons reportedly included Keith's partial paralysis
and blindness, remorse, religious conversion, and the possibility
that he may have shot Shryock in a reflex action.99
21. Lampkin, Beatrice. Ohio. January 10, 1991. Lampkin was
convicted and sentenced to death for hiring a man to kill her hus-
band.100 Her sentence was commuted to life because the gunman
had received a life sentence, and there was evidence that the vic-
tim had abused Lampkin throughout their twenty-five year
marriage. 10 1
22. Maurer, Donald Lee. Ohio. January 10, 1991. Maurer was
convicted of the 1982 abduction, sexual molestation, and murder of
a seven-year-old girl and sentenced to death." 2 The commutation
was granted because Maurer suffered from mental illness caused
by alcohol and drug abuse, and had an exemplary record of adjust-
ment in the prison.103
94. State v. Jester, 512 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 1987).
95. Stark Killer's Sentence, supra note 83, at 1.
96. Lane, supra note 66, at 1.
97. State v. Keith, 754 P.2d 474, 475 (Mont. 1988).
98. Id. at 475-76.
99. Bob Anez, David Keith Spared, MONT. STANDARD, Dec. 30, 1988, at 1.
100. State v. Lampkin, No. C-890273, 1990 LEXIS 4315, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 3,
1990).
101. Stark Killer's Sentence, supra note 83, at A6.
102. State v. Maurer, 473 N.E.2d 768, 773 (Ohio 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985).
103. Stark Killer's Sentence, supra note 83, at A6.
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23. Maynard, Anson Avery. North Carolina. January 10, 1992.
Maynard, a Coharie Indian, was sentenced to death for the 1981
murder of a former crime partner, who in exchange for a sentence
of probation, had agreed to testify about various larcenies he had
committed with Maynard. 04 The victim was allegedly murdered by
Maynard and Gary Bullard. However, the only evidence substanti-
ating this version of events came from the testimony of Bullard,
who testified against Maynard in exchange for total immunity. 10 5
One week before the scheduled execution, Maynard's death sen-
tence was commuted to life without parole by Governor James G.
Martin. The Governor said, "Because it is not clear on the basis of
all I have read and heard that Anson Maynard was not the mur-
derer, I conclude that he should remain in prison for the rest of his
life."'1 6 The defense contended that the actual murderer was a
man initially charged with the murder but given immunity in ex-
change for his testimony against Maynard.10 7
24. Monroe, Ronald S. Louisiana. August 17, 1989. Monroe was
convicted of breaking into the home of his next door neighbor and
stabbing her to death. After his first conviction and death sentence
were remanded on appeal, 08 Monroe was reconvicted and resen-
tenced to death. 09 The only evidence came from identifications by
the victim's children." 0 However, in 1980 the victim's husband was
convicted of killing his new wife - in a manner that had several
similarities to the first murder - and while serving his prison sen-
tence he all but admitted his guilt for the crime for which Monroe
had been convicted."' Following the recommendation of the Loui-
siana Pardon Board, Governor Buddy Roemer commuted Monroe's
sentence to life imprisonment because of doubts about his guilt.
Governor Roemer said he was convinced Monroe was guilty, but he
had enough doubts about it that he could not let the execution
104. State v. Maynard, 316 S.E.2d 197, 200 (N.C.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984).
105. Id.
106. Jane Ruffin, Martin Spares Inmate, RALEIGH NEWS AND OBSERVER, Jan. 11, 1992, at
1.
107. Id.
108. State v. Monroe, 366 So. 2d 1345 (La. 1978).
109. State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983).
110. Id. at 1264.
111. Peter Applebome, Louisiana Governor is Asked to Stop Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 1988, at 7; Only Two Weeks to Live, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1989, at 62, 63; Michael L.
Radelet, Don't Execute A Man Who May Very Well Be Innocent, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Aug. 15, 1989, at Bl.
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proceed.' 12 The Governor said: "While there is guilt for Ronald
Monroe, in an execution in this country the test ought not be rea-
sonable doubt; the test ought to be is there any doubt.""' 3
25. Moore, William Neal. Georgia. August 21, 1990. Moore
pleaded guilty to breaking into a home, shooting and killing its
seventy-seven-year-old owner, and stealing over $5,700.114 The day
before his scheduled execution, the Georgia Board of Pardons and
Paroles commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. In so doing,
they cited Moore's exemplary prison record, remorse, religious con-
version, the fact that there had been no trial, and the pleas for
clemency from the victim's family. Mother Teresa and the Rever-
end Jesse Jackson also joined the pleas for clemency." 5
26. Rutledge, Jesse Raymond. Florida. April 19, 1983. In 1974,
Rutledge was convicted of breaking into a home and stabbing a
woman and her three children."l6 The woman and one child
died. 1 7 Rutledge consistently maintained his innocence and the
evidence strongly implicated another man, who was never indicted
for the crime. The sentence was apparently commuted because of
doubts about Rutledge's guilt.""
27. Salvatore, Michael. Florida. May 19, 1981. Salvatore and two
companions were convicted of the 1975 murder of a Miami busi-
nessman, whose body was dumped into the Gulfstream and never
found." '9 At the clemency hearing, Salvatore's attorney argued that
Salvatore had nothing to do with the crime. That and the dispari-
ties in sentences between Salvatore and two others involved are
the likely explanations for the commutation. 20
112. Peter Applebome, Louisiana Governor to Spare Life of Inmate on Death Row, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1989, at 1; Jack Wardlaw & James Hodge, Execution Halted by Roemer,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 17, 1989, at 1.
113. Wardlaw & Hodge, supra note 113, at 1.
114. Moore v. State, 213 S.E.2d 829, 830 (Ga. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
115. Holly Morris, Board Spares Murderer, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 21, 1990, at 1; Ronald
Smothers, Day Short of Death, Convict in Georgia is Given Clemency, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
1990, at 1.
116. Rutledge v. State, 374 So. 2d 975, 976 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
117. Id.
118. George Bayliss, Convicted Slasher Wants Retrial in Hawthorne Case, GAINESVILLE
SUN, Nov. 28, 1983, at 8A; Julie Finch, Graham Requests Review of Death Row Case, FLOR-
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28. Seiber, Lee Edward, a.k.a. "Crazy Horse." Ohio. January 10,
1991. After being insulted in a bar, Seiber ordered four patrons to
lie on the floor; when one refused, Seiber shot him in the back.121
Seiber had suffered from mental problems ever since age eleven
when he sustained head injuries after being struck by a truck. This
reportedly formed the basis for the commutation. Seiber, who had
been in and out of psychiatric institutions, had last been treated
for his psychological problems just fifteen days before the
murder.122
29. Williams, Harold Glenn. Georgia. March 22, 1991. Williams
was convicted of and sentenced to death for burglary and the mur-
der of his grandfather in 1980.123 An accomplice, Williams's half-
brother, Dennis, was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and
was sentenced to ten years. 124 Appeals failed. 125 In commuting the
death sentence to life imprisonment, the Georgia Board of Pardons
and Paroles cited the disproportional sentence received by Dennis,
who by this time had taken full responsibility for the murder. The
chair of the Pardons Board was quoted as saying, "There was am-
ple evidence the co-defendant, Dennis Williams, was the ringleader
in the murder.' ' 12s Among those requesting clemency was former
President Jimmy Carter. 127
121. State v. Seiber, 564 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ohio 1990).
122. Stark Killer's Sentence, supra note 83, at 1; Mary Yost, Convicted Killer Was
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123. Williams v. State, 300 S.E.2d 301, 302 (Ga.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124 (1983).
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125. Williams v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 1276 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094
(1989), and cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); Williams v. Kemp, 338 S.E.2d 669 (Ga.), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
126. Jingle Davis, Ex-Marine's Death Sentence for Murder is Commuted, ATLANTA
CONST., Mar. 23, 1991, at B5.
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